Colorado Major Tax/Spending Elections

Year	Tax/Spending	Support %	Area
1992	Sales Tax - K-12 Schools	46%	Statewide
1993	Tourist Tax Extension	45%	Statewide
1992	Fuel Tax - 5 cents	16%	Statewide
1992	RTD - 0.4 Cents	42%	Metro
1992	TABOR Override - Road/School Projects	38%	Statewide
1992	TRANS Bonds - Federal Gas Tax	62%	Statewide
1992	RTD Bonds - TABOR Override	66%	Metro
Ciruli Associates, 1999

As the new millennium begins, Colorado voters broke the political gridlock and decided to get traffic moving. The TRANS bond proposal swept the state with 62 percent, carrying every large county and 44 of the 63 counties (one tied). The victory came after Governor Bill Owens and his team lost their initial effort to borrow money for roads by statute, then quickly switched their tactics to gamble on a state referendum. Governor Owens has gained substantial political strength by fulfilling his key election promise.

RTD, as one of the metro area's most controversial organizations, scored an amazing win after its 58 percent defeat only two years earlier. The turnaround reflected a less controversial Board, a more modest proposal than in the past, and the benefit of association with the governor's road campaign.The following are factors that affected the result:

More Congestion and Good Economy
Frustration with congestion and traffic gridlock continued to grow even while voters rejected various government proposals to fix the problem. Transportation remained among the top two or three concerns that voters wanted the state to address.

In addition, a feel-good era based on eight years of strong economic growth has put voters in a mood to solve problems and reduce the anti-tax, anti-government themes that dominated the start of the decade.

Transportation Election
Results 1998 - 1999

		TABOR Override 1998 Yes	TRANS Bond 1999 Yes
	Adams	32%	57%
	Arapahoe	41%	73%
	Boulder	49%	57%
	Denver	44%	66%
	Douglas	39%	77%
	El Paso	31%	60%
	Jefferson	38%	69%
	Larimer	45%	60%
	Mesa	29%	55%
	Pueblo	14%	52%
	Weld	36%	60%
	State Total	38%	62%
	Ciruli Associates, 1999

No New Taxes
As Doug Bruces' TABOR tax limitation effort demonstrated, repeated election attempts are important for educating voters and fine-tuning ballot language. The key factor in the successful formula devised first by the governor and then copied by RTD was the use of existing taxes. The highway proposal, with its federal gas tax repayment, was not a major concern for voters. Debt appeared less objectionable than new taxes.

Although the RTD proposal used TABOR surplus revenue, which was the bane of the 1998 state effort, opposition arguments were undermined by the fact that this election extended an already existing TABOR override and that there was little emphasis on how much money voters were giving up in refunds.

Another lesson of the tax limitation efforts of the late ‘80s and early ‘90s is that repeated elections dull the opposition case, making the arguments sound repetitious, tired and off-point.

New Republican Governor
A Republican governor popular among his colleagues and his party provided a credible advocate that disarmed many tax- and debt-wary fiscal conservatives. There were no high-profile Republicans, normally opposed to more government spending, who came out against the proposal.

Owens was also able to craft a rural and non-metro support base that attracted, or at least neutralized, economic and political groups that normally oppose initiatives that largely benefit the Denver metro area.

Democrats, while not enthusiastic, saw little political benefit in opposing what appeared to be a popular solution to a major public concern. In fact, high-profile Democrats such as former governors Romer and Lamm supported the proposal.

The statewide TRANS proposal added 24 percentage points in one year to Governor Roy Romer's 1998 TABOR override defeat. The proposal carried every major county, including Pueblo and Mesa, which gave the 1998 TABOR override only 25 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Even Boulder, which typically disparages more roads, gave the Republican governor's proposal a 57 percent victory.

Not surprising, Democrats were more supportive of the metro light rail proposal than were Republicans; but Republicans were the bedrock of support for the governor's TRANS initiative. The 9NEWS/KOA News Radio/Denver Post survey also showed women were slightly more pro-transit than men, whereas men were 10 percentage points more supportive of the roads proposal.

RTD Tax Elections
1980-1999
% Yes

County	Tax Increase 1980	TABOR Override 1994	TABOR Override 1995	Tax Increase 1997	Bonds/ TABOR Override 1999
Adams	38%	42%	41%	24%	44%
Arapahoe	49%	46%	55%	44%	74%
Boulder	49%	53%	63%	40%	65%
Denver	48%	52%	51%	50.4%	73%
Douglas	42%	52%	55%	47%	76%
Jefferson	43%	46%	52%	43%	61%
Total	46%	48%	53%	42%	66%
Ciruli Associates, 1999

Roads and Trains

The two proposals, highways and light rail, benefitted from being on the ballot at the same time. Infighting among highway and transit proponents was minimal. By working cooperatively the proponents enhanced credibility among each other's respective supporters and buffered each other from potential opponents.

RTD's proposal in particular was buoyed by the governor's support. Also, RTD's lower profile and less controversial Board made a more elusive target for opponents.

While the RTD proposal gained formidable margins in the south metro area, it also carried Jefferson and Boulder counties, which are less immediate beneficiaries of the I-25 improvements. Only Adams County continued to resist appeals for regional transit investments.

Massive Fund-raising and Campaigning
Spending in favor of ballot issues seldom rescues politically vulnerable initiatives. In fact, the victorious opponents in the 1997 and 1998 transportation elections were highly out-spent by supporters. But successful fund-raising can be a sign of support and help craft a persuasive message that makes victory more likely. Supporters of this year's transportation ballot initiatives dominated fund-raising, endorsements and campaign media. Opponents fund-raising and endorsement efforts were stymied by the governor's support for both of the transportation initiatives and by the sense that the proposals had a better chance than previous attempts.

Metro Turnout
1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999

	County	1993 Turnout	1995 Turnout	1997 Turnout	1999 Turnout
	Adams	43,725	41,961	44,568	46,688
	Arapahoe	93,526	88,985	90,525	102,201
	Boulder	56,006	59,973	56,242	51,812
	Denver	33,430	64,891	64,946	81,486
	Douglas	21,650	12,753	11,934	34,427
	Jefferson	110,920	102,329	112,832	43%
	Total	46%	48%	53%	121,427
	Ciruli Associates, 1999

Mailback Voting and Metro Turnout
Mailback voting in Douglas and Arapahoe counties provided a high turnout base of votes for RTD. The strong metro turnout helped the statewide highway proposal. (62% support statewide and 66% support in metro area).

Denver's high turnout reflected the millions spent in high-profile local bond and cable franchise elections. Only Boulder, which rejected mailback voting, saw its turnout decline.

Political and Policy Victories
The governor achieved major policy and political victories and established a strong platform for his leadership. His team is now in a powerful position to influence the next legislative session and state politics in general as the millennium begins. Denver Mayor Wellington Webb also is riding high on the success of Denver's cultural and economic bond proposals, as well as his cooperation with Owens' transportation proposal. Webb has enhanced his clout and dominance over Denver politics as he begins his last term. Also, Denver secured its position as the state's civic investment capital with the overwhelming success of its local ballot initiatives.

Conclusion
The success of the two transportation proposals was a confluence of significant and — for proponents — fortuitous factors: continued gridlock, a strong economy, repeated elections, weak opposition, a new governor and proposals with little tax impact. Policy entrepreneurs should not assume that Colorado voters are now in the mood for new large-scale tax or spending programs. At the same time these transportation projects were approved, numerous local tax and spending proposals were defeated. While voters appear in the mood to address big problems, they continue to maintain high levels of government distrust and tax resistance.

Victory for Transportation
November 2, 1999

Good Economy; More Gridlock; Multiple Elections; New Proposals; New Governor;

Major Factors Affecting Passage of TRANS and Light Rail

Frustration with congestion increased while good economy lessened the anti-government and anti-spending attitudes that dominated earlier in the decade. No tax increase left opponents unable to clearly articulate the downside. Government debt not that controversial. RTD's TABOR surplus less a target than state's. Republican governor neutralized conservative opposition and attracted Republican and non-metro support. Built a bi-partisan coalition. Both proposals more defined. RTD plan more modest. Multiple elections educated public and advocates. Opposition sounded repetitious and off-point. Highways and transit working together boosted credibility among each other's respective supporters and buffered each other from opponents. Lower profile and less conflict among RTD Board members. Significant fund-raising and campaign advertising. Republican governor's endorsement helped keep opponents wallets closed. Major victory for Governor Owens and his policy and political team. Mayor Webb maintained his Denver clout. City and state invested in its future at the Millennium.

Ciruli Associates, 1999

Related Links: The Culture of Opposition | RTD, Never a Smooth Ride | Public Wants Transit but Not at Any Price

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